An alleged spy balloon compelled Secretary Antony Blinken to postpone his China visit for which Beijing had never sent an official invitation. The U.S.-China relationship, in fact, seems to erode in its strategic depth and continues to remain volatile. Blinken once remarked that the US approach to China will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be.” This was nothing more than rhetoric. Such statements can only insufficiently address the bilateral diplomatic concerns, while also rendering the proposed strategies as fuzzy and non-pragmatic. Countries can compete and may still remain collaborative, or they can be adversarial and yet tend to compete. A Sino-US engagement of the future would thus be based on how quickly the United States is willing to embrace some key propositions. I outline them here.
First, the American narrative of China as an adversary does not work anymore
The United States supported China’s rise since 1979 and collaborated in technology, industrial production, trade, and investments. This led China to enjoy double-digit growth for close to three decades. As Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, the United States was compelled to believe that China is trying to deprive it of a role in the Asia-Pacific region. A series of strategic and geo-economic measures were undertaken. From Obama’s Asia Pivot to the call for expanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, both of them were part of the measures to assert an American role in this region. Later, with President Donald Trump in office, the Indo-Pacific construct – that was perceived by China adversely – gained utmost prominence in geopolitical discourse. The US National Security Strategy published in December 2017 asserted that a “geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.” The result was America’s newer realignments in the Indo-Pacific, U.S.-China trade war, revival of Quad (Quad 2.0), and then the efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through a G7 backed $40-trillion infrastructure plan named as Build Back Better World (B3W). Later, in 2022, President Joe Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) aiming to write new rules for the 21st century economies.
In fact, the post-COVID western narrative against China was totally uncalled for. The United States continued to show withdrawal syndrome in the Indo-Pacific region, and was no longer seen by their Asian allies as a reliable security partner. This scenario has only marginally changed after Biden assumed the presidency, though the mistrust remains. Countries in the Indo-Pacific are still refraining themselves from buying the American narratives, thus seeking not to be seen as being positioned against China. Many Asian economies continue to benefit from China both geo-economically and geo-strategically, as their trade and investments continue to reach higher trajectories.
Second, in the post-COVID scenario, supply chains were reconstructed only because of China, not the United States
The pandemic led to severe supply chain disruptions globally, and the Indo-Pacific region was no exception. Since the pandemic, there have been several efforts aligned with the American narrative that called for firms to shift their supply chains from China and to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains.
There have been calls for supply chain resilience and initiatives like China+1. Despite Japan promising incentives to its firms to move out of China and the U.S. calling their firms to quit China, the ground realities have remained the same. Many firms that even sought to relocate their manufacturing or value chain activities faced challenges related to economies of scale and supply-side constraints elsewhere. For them, continuing in China was the only win-win situation considering costs and logistical advantages. And the ones who partially relocated, went to other Southeast Asia countries, are again with China within the ambit of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Australia and Japan too had preferred to sign the RCEP in the mid of the pandemic, despite their own adverse narratives against China – perhaps China served their economic interests more than the U.S. could do at that time!
Third, China can fill the infrastructure and connectivity needs of developing countries; the United States remains clueless
Developing countries need seamless regional connectivity and have huge infrastructure financing requirements. Owing to the lack of a robust alternative mechanism that could ensure a transparent and rules-based order as the Americans possibly want, BRI potentially fills the gap. B3W’s undefined roadmap for generating private-sector capital and other operational challenges have perhaps paved the way for IPEF in 2022, but the benefits that IPEF can bestow upon American allies in the Indo-Pacific still remains unclear. It is still questionable if IPEF entails a serious American effort toward region-building in the Indo-Pacific, and that how can American allies potentially benefit from it.
An important reason why BRI funding has helped low- and middle-income countries is the relative failure of the international financial institutions (IFIs) – owing to their stringent norms – to fund the huge infrastructural needs of developing countries. The failure of IFIs has also led developing countries to explore their alternative financing mechanism viz. New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In fact, the BRI funding streamlines smaller recipient economies at least into a regional infrastructural ecosystem. The train from Laos to China that began in December 2021 is one of the many examples of the BRI corridors. The American debt-trap narrative has few takers, while low- and middle-income countries have their financing needs for connectivity and infrastructural development – and BRI loans work for them.
Fourth, China proactively seeks to become a net security solutions provider; the US is mostly shying away
There is no doubt that the United States is losing its position of strength in global negotiations. China has started dominating the American thinking more than it ever did. From its base in Djibouti to more strategic possibilities in the Maldives and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, China is strategically assertive and gradually positioning itself as a net security solution provider to riparian and other smaller states. Of course, India’s new initiative named Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) too is a step in the direction of ensuring maritime security, among its other pillars. Moreover, China has also called for a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis recently, through its 12-point position paper on Ukraine. The United States, however, continues to maintain a strategic ambiguity on Ukraine just like it does on the issue of Taiwan.
Therefore, considering the outlined propositions, it is crucial for the United States to work for region-building, instead of propagating an anti-China narrative and compelling its allies to do so. Not to forget, for most of the US allies, China continues to be their major trading partner. China is going to be more assertive as a power, and the United States must seek strategic depth in Sino-US relations instead of relying on rhetoric.
Faisal Ahmed is Trade and Geopolitical Expert on Indo-Pacific & China Issues, Professor of International Business, FORE School of Management, New Delhi.